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Pharmaceutical regulators and healthcare reimbursement authorities operate in different
intellectual paradigms and adopt very different decision rules. As a result, drugs that have
been licensed are often not available to all patients who could benefit because
reimbursement authorities judge that the cost of therapies is greater than the health
produced. This finding creates uncertainty for pharmaceutical companies planning their
research and development investment, as licensing is no longer a guarantee of market
access. In this study, we propose that it would be consistent with the objectives of
pharmaceutical regulators to use the Net Benefit Framework of reimbursement authorities
to identify those therapies that should be subject to priority review, that it is feasible to do
so and that this would have several positive effects for patients, industry, and healthcare
systems.
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Healthcare systems are struggling to pay for the newest
pharmaceutical therapies; especially those produced through
exploitation of the developments in biotechnology and ge-
nomics. These costs can be orders of magnitude greater than
the conventional small molecule therapies (18).
There has been a variety of responses to this problem.
Some have argued that cost of developing new drugs is too
high and that this threatens our ability to reap the benefit
from recent advances in medical science. Others have argued
that the return on investment in the pharmaceutical industry
is not sustainable (2), whereas still others have argued that
these costs should be met as they are an investment in future
innovation (18).
Those responsible for managing healthcare budgets have
designed systems that attempt to allocate resources to thera-
pies on the basis of some assessment of the value of the health
produced (4;15;17). These processes have been criticized for
impeding patient access to therapies that the licensing author-
ities have already assessed and deemed to be of value (1).
In this study, we briefly review the evidence for the in-
creasing influence of cost-value assessments in determining
market access. We then consider the function of the licensing
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authorities. The section Licensing, Reimbursement, and the
Public Health examines the nature of the tension between li-
censing and reimbursement. In the section Combining Costs,
Effectiveness, and a Public Health Perspective, we outline
a proposal for the adoption of value-based assessment in
a small but important area of licensing activity—expedited
review—arguing that this would improve the ability of li-
censing authorities to meet their stated objectives. The sec-
tion Challenges to Implementation of a Net Benefit Approach
considers potential benefits and problems with value-based
licensing.
LICENSING, VALUE ASSESSMENTS, AND
MARKET ACCESS
Until the 1990s, licensing was the sole hurdle to market ac-
cess for the pharmaceutical industry. However, the past 20
years has seen the gradual development of an additional hur-
dle to market access. Organizations responsible for managing
healthcare budgets increasingly require evidence on value for
money. To be good value, drugs have to provide health gain at
a price that is deemed affordable. Canada and Australia were
early pioneers of this approach, and by 2007, many major
markets have established processes that consider the value,
or efficiency, of new drugs as part of the reimbursement de-
cision making process. Even the United States, the Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission is now required to consider
the budgetary implications of its recommendations (13).
As a result of these developments, pharmaceutical com-
panies are concerned about the sustainability of the return on
the large investments they make in the research and devel-
opment; and researchers are increasingly concerned that the
public will not be able to reap the benefits of today’s rapid
expansion in medical knowledge (18).
Pharmaceutical Licensing
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the European
Medicines Evaluation Agency are responsible for licensing
drugs for approximately 80 percent of the world pharmaceu-
tical market. The stated aims of these two organizations are
remarkably similar, and both include the promotion of public
health (11;12).
Of interest, although the public health is mentioned in
both mission statements, neither organization provides a def-
inition of what they mean by “the public health.” The Oxford
Textbook of Public Health provides the following definition:
“Public health is the process of mobilizing and engaging lo-
cal, state, national, and international resources to assure the
conditions in which people can be healthy.” (italics added)
(8).
To effectively pursue the objective of promoting the
public health, licensing authorities may legitimately wish
to consider whether a specific “mobilization of resources”
makes a greater or lesser contribution to people’s capacity to
be healthy, than an alternative “mobilization of resources.”
Thus, consideration of what economists call opportunity
cost is not inconsistent with the objectives of the licensing
authorities.
Although consideration of opportunity cost may not be
inconsistent with the licensing authorities’ objectives, to date
they have not done so. Licensing has operated in a consumer
protection framework. Their role has been to ensure the prod-
uct is safe and efficacious. The consumer decides whether the
cost to them is justified by the expected health gain. However,
the cost of drugs means that such individual decisions are in-
creasingly rare. The opportunity cost implications of paying
for a specific treatment are rarely confined to an individual.
In systems where the healthcare budget is fixed, paying for
new interventions displaces other treatments. Under insur-
ance, the inclusion of a more expensive treatment increases
insurance premiums and, at the margin, some individuals
are squeezed out of the healthcare insurance market. As the
cost of new drugs increases, the link between licensing in a
consumer protection framework and the promotion of public
health becomes increasingly tenuous.
LICENSING, REIMBURSEMENT, AND THE
PUBLIC HEALTH
Licensing focuses upon quality, efficacy, and safety. It con-
siders whether the benefits the therapy provides to the many
outweigh the harm that it will do to a few; benefits and harms
are considered in terms biochemical markers and clinical
events. Such measures, with the exception of mortality, are
disease specific. Thus, licensing only considers the popula-
tion of people with the condition for which the therapy will
be licensed. It is unable to consider the benefits and harms
to the total population. This is a significant constraint on its
capacity to promote public health, as it cannot compare the
population health implications of prioritizing the licensing
of one therapy or another.
There is a perception that reimbursement processes are
fundamentally different to licensing processes. However,
both share the central principle of balancing the benefits
and the harms in deciding whether it should be made avail-
able. The difference between them is in the scope of benefits
and harm, and the population they consider. Reimbursement
authorities increasingly recognize that, when resources are
limited, one of the harms associated with providing a therapy
for one person is the opportunities for health gain forgone for
others. The resources consumed are not available to provide
other treatments. Reimbursement authorities consider these
opportunity costs of reimbursement as well as the therapeutic
benefit.
Balancing Public Health with
Individual Rights
Licensing authorities have a responsibility for protecting
and promoting individual rights as well as promoting public
health. An individual’s right to access a safe and efficacious
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drug should not be curtailed on the grounds that the drug is
not an efficient use of society’s resources. The individual has
the right to decide whether it is a valuable use of their private
resources, and all individuals have that right, equally, includ-
ing the extremely wealthy who pay for their health care from
private resources.
Processes that prioritize some treatments by definition
do not treat all individuals equally. When licensing authori-
ties do not treat all individuals equally, it would seem sensible
that such unequal treatment should be consistent with the au-
thorities’ stated objectives.
Fast Tracking and Public Health
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the European
Medicines Agency (EMEA) operate schemes to reduce the
time to licensing for some drugs. These fast-track processes
gives special treatment to the individuals with the target dis-
eases for the selected therapies. All things being equal, they
will receive new treatments more quickly than individuals
whose treatments are approved through the standard pro-
cess. However, the criteria by which therapies are selected
for the fast-track licensing process are not obviously focused
on promoting public health; focused as they are on innovative
modes of action and biochemical measures of magnitude of
effect.
The advantages of being subject to the fast-track pro-
cesses can be significant. For example, the EMEA fast-track
procedure halves the target time to a decision, compared with
the normal licensing process; the FDA fast-track procedure
reduces the target time from 10 months to 6 months. Given
the revenue streams of block buster drugs, even 4 months
additional revenue can represent a substantial benefit.
The FDA-accelerated approval process will accept sur-
rogate end points. This finding can have a major impact on
the time to licensing as it reduces the duration of trial follow-
up. This finding in turn drives down the cost of Phase 3
trials, one of the major costs in pharmaceutical research and
development.
As the licensing authorities adopt a disease specific ap-
proach to assessing benefit, unless the benefit is confined to
mortality, they cannot assess whether fast-tracked therapies
contribute more or less to the public health than therapies
in the standard processes. This problem has long been rec-
ognized in the health economics literature with the result
that many reimbursement processes accept quality-adjusted
life-years (QALYs) as a measure of health outcome (3;14).
Considering Opportunity Cost in Licensing
to Promote the Public Health
Considering the potential harms to the wider community
(opportunity costs) necessarily entails an assessment of the
likely cost of the therapy. To date, licensing authorities have
explicitly and consciously avoided considering the expected
cost of the therapies (18). Rawlins, arguing for more efficient
safety testing in pharmaceutical research and development,
explicitly discounted a role for price consideration in licens-
ing, arguing that considering price in licensing would ignore
citizen’s equal right to access safe and effective therapies.
Rawlins was also concerned that decision makers would
confuse the decision about the safety and efficacy and its
cost-effectiveness.
We agree with Rawlins that licensing authorities cannot
ignore the rights of individuals to access safe and effective
treatments that they can afford, just because others cannot
afford them. Furthermore, our proposal would not carry the
risk of highly effective but expensive treatments would not
be licensed. However, it is not inappropriate to consider the
expected cost of drugs when choosing whether a particular
drug should receive preferential treatment in the licensing
process. For these therapies, other people’s rights to equal
treatment within the licensing process has already been ab-
rogated and, therefore, it is legitimate to consider whether
the total benefit to the community is greater than the total
harm to the community.
At the beginning of the 21st century, the vast majority
of health care is funded through the organizations that have
very real resource constraints. The aging population and the
causal relationship between age and demand for health care
means that these resource constraints are likely to become
more not less severe, even if we assume that the cost of
healthcare stabilizes. In this environment, licensing author-
ities’ contribution to the public health may be substantially
improved by an explicit consideration of the expected cost
of the drugs they review.
Some have expressed a concern that a high regulatory
hurdle will discourage investment in healthcare research and
development and, thus, interfere with the innovation cascade
that has been observed over the past 50 years. It is undoubt-
edly true that the utilization of cost-effectiveness in prioriti-
zation would be likely to have some impact upon healthcare
research and development. However, given the success rate
of pharmaceutical research and development, where the fail-
ure rate at Phase 3 is generally accepted to be in the region
of 2 out of 3; it does not necessarily follow that more cau-
tion in investment would lead to fewer effective therapies
arriving at market. This would only be the case if there was
no capacity for improving the targeting of investment de-
cisions. If this were the case, lower investment would lead
to fewer treatments being developed with the same relative
success rate and, thus, a lower number of effective therapies
making it to market. However, there are reasons to believe
that the current pricing environments may not promote ef-
ficient investment decisions. Typically, industry is allowed
to amortize the cost of the failed therapies in research and
development through the price of the successful treatments.
For companies that have a portfolio of treatments in devel-
opment, a major proportion of the risk of the investment is
effectively underwritten by the healthcare payers’ commit-
ment to paying high prices for future successful drugs. If this
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Box 1. Net Benefit
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) = C/E
Net monetary benefit (NMB) = RT E − C
Net health benefit (NHB) = E − (C/RT )
RT = Threshold ratio; C = Difference in mean cost between comparators;
C = Difference in mean effect between comparators
commitment is tempered, then companies will be more risk
averse, and we should, therefore, observe fewer failures in
late stage development. It is only if the Phase 3 successes
systematically tend to have a lower than average probability
of success on the basis of Phase 2 data, that encouraging
more risk averse investments at Phase 3 would be expected
to lead to fewer successful treatments reaching market.
COMBINING COSTS, EFFECTIVENESS,
AND A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE
If we knew which health-generating activities would be dis-
placed by the additional resources required by a new technol-
ogy, then we could directly address the question of whether
the overall public health would be improved by asking
whether the gains in health generated by the new technol-
ogy exceed the health gains displaced elsewhere in the wider
community. In other words, the true cost of the technology
is the total net health forgone by the community to make the
therapy available.
Based on some assessment of what is likely to be dis-
placed within the healthcare system (a cost-effectiveness
threshold) (7), we can translate resource costs into health and
directly compare health gain to health cost or equivalently
convert heath gains into resources and compare the equivalent
monetary benefits to monetary costs (see Box 1) (10). These
net health or net monetary benefits combine health benefits
and costs that fall across the wider community and enable
assessment of whether a technology is likely to improve the
public health.
When considering provision of the technology for an in-
dividual patient, if the net benefit is positive, then there will
be a net increase in the public health. Of course the overall
contribution of the technology to the public health requires
some assessment of the size of the current and future pop-
ulation that could benefit from this technology. The greater
the population net benefit, the greater the contribution to
the public health. Assuming that the measure of health gain
captures all important effects of therapies submitted to the
licensing authority, net benefit provides a basis on which the
licensing authority can assess the case for fast-track review.
The licensing authority can then allocate the priority review
resources to those therapies that are expected to make the
greatest contribution to the public health.
An important characteristic of this system is that the as-
sessment of contribution to the public health would have to
be undertaken at the healthcare system level. This is because
it is the interaction between the healthcare system budget
and current activities that determines the cost-effectiveness
threshold (7). As the major licensing authorities serve mul-
tiple healthcare systems, each with different budgets and
portfolios of activity, separate net benefit calculations would
have to be done for each system, and the results summed.
For the purposes of ranking therapies for fast-track li-
censing, the expected net benefit for healthcare systems in
which the intervention was expected to be negative would be
set to zero, on the basis that these systems would not in fact
pay for the therapy and, therefore, the expected health loss
would not be incurred. Thus, the correct calculation would be
to sum the expected net benefit across all healthcare systems
in which expected net benefit was positive.
CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF A
NET BENEFIT APPROACH
The use of net benefit in licensing would face the same criti-
cisms as its use in reimbursement. However, there are some
additional potential challenges with using the net benefit ap-
proach in licensing. First, if the criterion for fast tracking is
the population net benefit, then the probability that a therapy
will be fast tracked will be directly related to the prevalence
of the disease. If society does not wish to see this type of
inequality, the individual expected net benefit can be used
to select therapies for fast track. This would maintain a link
between fast-tracking selection and promotion of the public
health, although it would no longer maximize the contribu-
tion to public health of the fast-track system.
Second, the difference in the value of a unit of a health
gain would vary between systems. Systems with large bud-
gets would attribute greater net benefits for any given ther-
apy. This would mean that therapies for diseases prevalent in
wealthier healthcare systems would be more likely to be fast
tracked, which would in turn create an incentive to develop
therapies for diseases prevalent in these healthcare systems.
However, the operation of the free market already ensures
that there is an incentive to develop therapies for diseases
prevalent in countries with the greatest ability to pay. It is
not obvious that the use of the net benefit framework would
make things worse. Indeed, individual nations that wished
to promote the development of treatments for disease that
were most prevalent in poorer countries could specify an
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alternative cost-effectiveness threshold for evaluating the net
benefit of such treatments.
Perhaps more importantly, the variation in the value of
a unit of health gain might create incentives for companies
to propose lower prices in countries with lower budgets to
maximize the expected net benefit across all the healthcare
systems. In such circumstances, it would be important that
these prices were then implemented in practice.
In principle, there is also an issue of the value of the
innovations foregone as a result of reduced incentives to in-
vest in healthcare research and development (16). However,
as discussed above, this assumes that the current investment
behaviors are efficient from a population health perspective.
Given the failure rate in Phase 2 and 3 of the clinical devel-
opments programs, there is a prima facie case that the level
of investment could be reduced without adversely affecting
the productivity of the research and development pipeline.
Associated with the argument for considering the op-
tion value of the innovation foregone is the observation that
incremental advances may act as stepping stones to break
through developments. There is a concern that displacing
even marginal developments in treatment will disrupt the
process of incremental advances and, thus, threaten subse-
quent breakthroughs. In principle, this is true. However, in the
context of promoting public health, the question is whether
the net value of the expected future health gain foregone
from the incremental benefits and subsequent breakthrough
is greater than the expected health benefits from providing
incentives for faster access to more cost-effective treatments,
and potentially for more people.
Benefits of Adopting the Net Benefit
Framework for Priority Review
The most obvious benefit of adopting a net benefit frame-
work approach to selecting therapies for priority review is
to strengthen the link between the licensing processes and
promoting the public health. However, there are other poten-
tial benefits; the net benefit framework could promote more
efficient production process in manufacturing, and perhaps
more importantly, would be particularly valuable in formal-
izing the standards for considering a claim substantiated.
A favorable net benefit can be achieved through either
greater efficacy or a lower cost. Thus, a me-too therapy that,
through innovation in production technology, came to mar-
ket at a lower price could qualify for priority review, leading
to large gains in public health. This is particularly important
for biotech therapies, where the production technologies are
developed rapidly, and licensed therapies are often manufac-
tured using older higher cost production technologies. The
use of the net benefit framework could introduce a down-
ward pressure on the price of new therapies. As the net benefit
framework quantifies the expected public health benefit from
making a therapy available, it facilitates the estimation of the
public health benefit foregone if a therapy is not entered into
the priority review process.
Regulators have to decide whether the evidence sub-
mitted supports the claim of the sponsor that, at the popu-
lation level, the expected benefits from the use of the new
therapy exceed the expected harms. Historically, little has
been written on the evidence required to substantiate a claim.
The most recent FDA Modernization Act notes that whether
a claim is considered substantiated “depends upon several
factors. . . .these include the type of product, the consequence
of a false claim, the benefits of a true claim, the costs of de-
veloping substantiation for the claim” (13).
The net benefit framework allows the quantification and
valuation of both the consequences of a false claim and the
benefits of a true claim. It has been shown how, in turn these
data can be used to establish whether it is efficient to re-
quire more evidence before approval or give conditional ap-
proval while more evidence is collected (5;6). The net benefit
framework allows the regulator to place a value on the un-
certainty attributable to expedited licensing and the expected
health gain foregone from declining to fast track. It also al-
lows the identification of the important parameters in the
decision problem for which additional research is efficient,
when conditional approval is provided. Thus, the net benefit
framework can inform both post-launch (Phase 4) research
and pharmacovigilance programs.
By incorporating consideration of uncertainty and total
health gain into licensing processes, the net benefit frame-
work may influence decision making with the pharmaceutical
research and development process before licensing. The use
of expedited review as an incentive may promote the devel-
opment of therapies that have a higher probability of pro-
ducing substantial health gain and by implication reduce or
remove the incentive to develop therapies of marginal value
compared with therapies already on the market. This in turn
could lead to a higher threshold for positive decisions on the
transition to Phase 3 trials. All things being equal, this could
lead to fewer failures in Phase 3. As the need to amortize the
cost of failures in Phase 3 is one of the major contributory
factors to the high cost of developing new therapies, there is
the potential for a reduction in the average cost of developing
new therapies (9).
The degree to which any of these effects would be ob-
served depends upon the magnitude of the advantage avail-
able from the fast-track system. If licensing authorities ac-
cepted the appropriateness of using fast-track review systems
to promote public health, they could vary the characteristics
of the fast-track system as a signaling mechanism.
SUMMARY
Historically, pharmaceutical licensing authorities have acted
as consumer protection organizations, ensuring that drugs are
safe and manufacturers’ claims are reasonable. This model of
licensing was consistent with healthcare consumption being
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Box 2. Fourth-Hurdle Organizations
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee Australia
Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health Canada
Haute Autorite Sante France
Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care Germany
Pharmacy Advisory Committee New Zealand
Norwegian Medicines Evaluation Centre Norway
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence United Kingdom
primarily a decision made by individual citizens and funded
from the private resources. Increasingly healthcare consump-
tion is determined by system wide guidelines rather than in-
dividual preferences, and it is financed from either general
taxation or social insurance. Against this background, it may
be appropriate for licensing authorities to adopt a broader
remit than consumer protection.
In this study, we have argued that, when the price of a
therapy has a substantial impact upon the proportion of the
population that can access them, it is appropriate, legitimate,
and feasible for licensing authorities such as the FDA and the
EMEA to use the expected net benefit of a new therapy as
the basis on which to identify therapies for expedited review.
The proliferation of fourth-hurdle organizations (see
Box 2) across the developed world, including the United
States, has implications for the suitability of the current phar-
maceutical licensing frameworks. Now may be the time for
the licensing authorities to engage with a value-based regu-
lation paradigm.
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